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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
METALS MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.

Case No.
10116

BANK OF COMMERCE,
a Utah corporation,

Defendant and Respondent.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. This appeal presents the question of whether there
is any valid reason or grounds for overturning the Trial
Court's finding that the aluminum railings used to direct
customer traffic and for decorative purposes in the respondent's bank are simply personal property and do not
constitute a ubuilding, structure or improvement of the
land" as that term is used in Section 14-2-1 of the Utah
Code Annotated.
B. The lower court sitting without a jury after having considered the evidence presented by both sides, found
that such aluminum railings were not in the nature of an
improvement to the structure and were, therefore, personal property not subject to the Utah Private Contracts
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statute. Accordingly, the lower court entered judgment
for the defendant and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.

C. Because the facts as set forth in appellant's brief
tend to be argumentive in favor of plaintiff's case, respondent sets forth the following as his statement of facts.
In the spring of 1963, respondent leased a bank building in Magna, Utah for the purpose of conducting a commercial banking business. Under the terms of the lease,
the building was to be remodeled by the lessor to meet
certain requirements of the lessee. The lease anticipated
that all furnishings contained in the bank building would
be furnished by the lessee. Prior to opening its banking
business, respondent contracted with Arnold Drews of
Modern Ornamental Iron Works for certain aluminum
railings and gates. Drews submitted a bid for this work
of $1,457.10 which was accepted by respondent (Dep. p.
7). Drews requested an advance payment on the railings
representing that a lower price could be obtained if he
had the cash to pay for the materials at the time they
were ordered. Respondent, through its agent, C. I. Canfield, advanced $1,200.00 upon the representation of
Drews (Dep. p. 5) Drews, without respondent's knowledge or consent, contracted with the appellant for the
construction of these railings and agreed to pay appellant
$1,748.00 for the railings. He represented to the appellant that the railings were constructed for the Idaho State
Bank. Drews picked up the railings from appellant and
installed them in respondent's bank. Respondent then
paid him for the railings. Drews failed to pay appellant
for the railings and when appellant discovered that the
railings were, in fact, in respondent's bank, it made de-
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mand on respondent for payment. Since respondent had
already made payment for the railings, it refused to pay
a second time whereupon appellant commenced action,
under the Utah Private Contracts Act, Section 14-2-2 of
the Utah Code Annotated, to recover the reasonable value
of its materials. Respondent defended this action and the
Trial Court sitting without a jury, and after having considered the evidence presented by both sides, found that
such aluminum railings were personal property not subject to the Utah Private Contracts Act.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POIN'T I
IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FO·R RELIEF UNDER
THE UTAH PRIVATE CONTRACTS STATUTE
IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION BE ANNEXED TO THE LAND OR
SOME PERMANENT STRUCTURE UPON IT WITH
THE INTENTION OF MAKING SUCH PROPERTY
A PERMANENT PART OF THE LAND OR STRUCTURE.
POINT II
THE STATUTE IN QUESTION IS PENAL IN
NATURE, IN THAT IT IMPOSES A DOUBLE LIABILITY ON THE OWNER OF PROPERTY WHO
PAYS AN UNBONDED CONTRACTOR, AND
THEREFORE IT SHOULD BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED.
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POINT III
THE DEFENDANT, HAVING PREVAILED IN
THE TRIAL COURT, IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE
APPELLATE COURT VIEW THE EVIDENCE AND
EVERY FAIR INFERENCE AND INTENDMENT
ARISING THEREFROM IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO IT. AND IF WHEN SO, REGARDED,
THERE IS ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, OiR, AS
SOMETIMES STATED ANY REASONABLE BASIS IN
THE EVIDENCE, TO SUPPOIRT THE FINDING
MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT, IT WILL NOT BE
DISTURBED.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR RELIEF UNDER
THE UTAH PRIVATE CONTRACTS STATUTE
IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION BE ANNEXED TO· THE LAND OR
SOME PERMANENT STRUCTURE UPON IT WITH
THE INTENTION OF MAKING SUCH PROPERTY
A PERMANENT PART OF THE LAND OR STRUCTURE.
The statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
u14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, involving $500 or more, for the
construction, addition to, or alteration or repair of,
any building, structure or inzprovement upon land
shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain
from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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contract price, with good and sufficient sureties,
conditioned for the faithful performance of the
contract and prompt payment for material furnished and labor performed under the contract.
Such bond shall run to the owner and to all other
persons as their interest may appear; and any person who has furnished materials or performed labor
for or upon any such building, structure or improvement, payment for which has not been made,
shall have a direct right of action against the sureties upon such bond for the reasonable value of the
materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed
upon; which right of action shall accrue forty days
after the completion, or abandonment, or default
in the performance, of the work provided for in
the contract.
((The bond herein provided for shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon request.
u14-2-2. Failure to require bond-Direct liability. Any person subject to the provisions of this
chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and
sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein
required, shall be personally liable to all persons
who have furnished materials or performed labor
under the contract for the reasonable value of such
materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed
upon." Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
In a recent case involving this statute, the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah stated the rule under this
statute as follows:
uln order to qualify under these statutes it is
necessary that there be an annexation to the land,
or to some permanent structure upon it, so that the
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materials in question can properly be regarded as
having become a part of the realty; or a fixture
appurtenant to it; and this must have been done
with the intention of making it a permanent part
thereof." King Bros. Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Contpany, 13 U 2nd 339, 342; 374 P 2nd 254 (1962)
Considering these authorities, it seems clear that the
Utah rule as to the application of the statute in question
requires that in order for property to be covered, it must
be annexed to the land or structure with an intention of

making it a perntanent part of such land or structure.
In the case of Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Hawthorn, ISO P.2d SS, 57 {1944) a case cited
as authority for the rule announced by the Court in the
King Bros. Case, Supra, after finding that the law relating
to fixtures applied and that the intention with which a
chattel is placed upon real estate is determinative in questions where doubt exists, the Court set forth the following
tests for determining the presence or absence of intent:
uThe intent is not to be gathered from testimony of the actual state of the mind of the party
making the annexation * * * but is to be inferred,
when not determined by an express agreement,
from the nature of the article affixed, the relation
and situation to the freehold of the party making
the annexation, the manner of the annexation, and
the purpose for which it is made."
Since there was no express agreement between the
vendor and vendee in the instant case as to whether the
railings in question were supposed to be permanent fixtures, the four principal tests for determining intention,
as set out by the court in Westinghouse Electric, Supra,
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and quoted above, become the governing criteria, i.e. the
nature of the article; the relation and situation to the
freehold of the party making annexation; the manner of
annexation and the purpose for which annexation was
made. It is obvious from the most cursory review of the
evidence in this case, that under this and any other tests,
the trial Court correctly determined that the railings in
question were not and were never intended to become part
of the real estate.
(a) uThe nature of the article." The railings involved
in this case were made from aluminum bars and were designed to be and are in fact easily portable 1I as shown by
defendant's Exhibit D-5 and by the testimony of respondent's Vice President (Rec. 11, 12) the railings were constructed and attached in such a way that they can be
moved from place to place on the bank premises or can
be removed entirely if the volume of business makes it
necessary for them to be removed. These plans for the
use of the railings were communicated to the lessor of respondent's building and among respondent's officers. (R
17, 18, 19. Dep. p. 10, lines 8-10) With regard to the design of the railings, Mr. C. I. Canfield, Vice President of
the respondent, stated at pages 12, 13, 16 and 17 of the
Record.

uQ. well, just the general theory of the plan
that was used for the bank. Was there any one
central idea that prevailed in planning the bank?
I I It is interesting to note that a female secretary of the Vice President
of respondent removed one of the rail~ngs invo_lved. i_n this case in a t;natter
of five minutes using only a screw dnver. This rathng was then earned to
the Trial Court. (Rec. 13, 14).
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uA. Well, he set up the plan of the bank, the
inside of the bank, so that it can be ad jus ted and
moved as situations require it in our operation.
uQ. Thank you. At the time you planned the
bank building did you contemplate the possibility
that you might to have to move to a different
building?
u.A. Well, we discussed it; there is always that
possibility.
u.Q. And if you did move to another building
did you contemplate the necessity of moving the
interior facilities of the bank?
u.A. He set it up so that all of the equipment
we have got belongs to the company, so that we can
move it if we want to."
In the negotiation of the lease agreement, respondent's officers anticipated that they would want to move
the railings and other furnishings from the leased premises and they specifically requested the inclusion of a provision in the lease permitting removal of these furnishings
(Dep. p. 11, lines 1 thru 5 and lines 14 thru 21) (Dep·.
p. 16 and 17, lines 1 thru 9) . Since respondents were lessees, it can be presumed that they had no intention to enrich the freehold. See Westinghouse Electric Supply v.
Hawthorn, Supra at 58.
Testimony of a witness engaged in the production of
such railings indicates that they are frequently moved
from place to place by banking institutions and are treated
much the same as items of furniture. (R. 31, line 1-7, 1624)
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"MR. DAI-ILSTROM: Have you had occasion to install these aluminum railings in any other
buildings where your customers have been engaged
in the banking business?
uTHE WITNESS: Yes, I have.

uQ. How are they generally installed?
uA. They are generally fastened to the floor
by one means or another, or the walls as the next
thing.
uQ. What single bank is your principal customer for the production of these railings?
uA. I have done a great deal of work-or considerable work for the First Security Bank.

uQ. Have you ever been called upon by the
First Security Bank to tnove any railings from one
building to another.
'-"A. Not from one building to another, but
from one location in a building to another location
in the building."
Moreover, as pointed out by Mr. Canfield at the trial,
there were and are plans to move the railings from place
to place in the bank or to remove them entirely. In short,
these railings are much the same as the desks, telephones,
bookkeeping machines, the sound system or the water
cooler, all of which are attached in some way to the building but can be and would be moved from place to place or
removed from the building entirely if circumstances
dictated.
Items such as this and heavier, more major pieces
of equipment have long been held by the courts to be the
type of article which constitutes personal property rather
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than leinable realty. See Ward v. To1vn Tavern, 191 Or
1,288 P 2nd 216,42 ALR 2nd 662, 667 (1951). A case
holding a coffee urn, a steam chest, a soda fountain, a
refrigerator and a vanity table not to be leinable because
they were removable by the lessee owner at will. In the
Westinghouse Electric case, Supra, the court found that
electric motors, switches, upush buttons," upulleys" and
((sliding rails" were not fixtures subject to a lein because
of lack of evidence showing an intent to permanently affix
them to the building.
In its brief, appellant criticizes the lower court's decision complaining that the lower court did not consider
evidence presented by appellant that the railing was specifically constructed to fit specific requirements as to
length, width and heighth supplied by Arnold Drews
(App. Br. p. 5, 8, 10 and 13). The appellant cites the
case of Knoff Woodwards Con~pany v. Zotales, 213 Minn.
204, 6 N.W. 2d 264, 266 ( 1942) as holding that the special
construction of the railings and gates shows they were intended to constitute part of the building.
Appellant seems to feel that the special construction
of the railings is in itself determinative of the questions
of whether the railings were part of the building. Actually the cases, including the case cited by the appellant,
hold that special construction is only one of many minor
factors to be considered in determining whether there
was an intention to annex the property in question to the
land. Actually the case cited by the appellant on page 6
of his brief is distinguishable from the present case in
that it involved a suit against a land owner and a statute
requiring notice of non responsibility of land owners. The
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property in question in that case was a wall dividing the
building into two parts. Obviously, this case and the conclusions drawn from it by appellant are not applicable in
the present case. And, as pointed out above, the special
construction of these railings was not to permanently
fix them to the building but to allow for their movement
from place to place in the building or to be removed altogether. Also because of their peculiar design they could
not have been used in the building for any business except
the banking business. The design was for portability, not
permanence. There is no rule of law holding that special
construction or design in and of itself makes an item of
personal property become real property. In each case it
is necessary to consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the special construction or design.
On page 6 of its brief, appellant claims that the court
did not consider that the desirability as part of the architectual design or finish of the building is determinative of
the question of whether the railings are realty or personalty. In the first place, no evidence was introduced at
trial to show that these railings were in any way part of
the architectural finish of the building. In fact, they were
considered to be furnishings by the persons who designed
and constructed the building (Dep. 14 and 1S). Secondly,
even if the railings were desirable as part of the finish of
the building, they would not, under the Utah rule, automatically become part of the realty.
Appellant cites certain testimony at page 7 of his
brief which he contends the Trial Court should have considered as an indication that respondent intended that the
railings remain attached to the premises. However, he fails
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to consider that the basic thrust of respondent's testimony
indicated the lack of such an intention.
Continuing on where appellant left off at (Dep. 15,
line 9-11, 16, lines 20-24, 17, lines 3-9)
uMR. MECHAM: So that any of these fixtures could be taken out?
uA. Yes, or moved to any place we want to
at our convenience."

*

* *

uQ. Why did you want it in?
uA. So we could remove these fixtures and
equipment. Mr. Rokich rewrote the lease with
these things in and it was duly executed and signed,
but the effective da~e was not made until I give the
go ahead sign as of the first of May, 1963.)1
uQ. At the time, as you have described, you
had this provision put in the lease, did you anticipate having to use this provision?
uA. Well, the only way I can answer that is
if our business develops the way I had hoped and
still hope it will that I know from past experience
we would have to make changes in the bank."
In essence, what the appellant has claimed is that the
Trial Court, in considering the facts, has decided against
him as a factual matter, without considering the evidence,
such as it was, presented by him. Appellant fails to realize
that the trial court may well have considered his evidence
and rejected it in favor of the weight of evidence showing
a lack of any intent to permanently annex the railings in
question to the real estate.
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(b) uThe relation and situation to the freehold of the
party making annexation." The respondent occupies the
premises as a lessee and, therefore, has no interest in enriching the freehold for his own benefit, as he might have
if he were the owner of the freehold. (Dep. p. 15) . The
appellant spends a considerable part of its brief discussing
the effect of the lease agreement between respondent and
its lessor. Appellant claims that as a third party to this
agreement, it is not legally bound by the terms of the
agreement.
In the first place, respondent has made no claim that
appellant is legally bound by the terms of the lease agreement. The lease is introduced merely as evidence of the
intention of the party annexing the property not to permanently affix such property to the realty. The consideration of the lease for that purpose is in no way dependent
on the question of whether appellant is legally bound by
the terms of the lease.
Secondly, appellant cites the case of Hammond Lumber Company v. Gardner, 84 Cal. App, 701, 258 P. 612
( 1927) as standing for the proposition that in order for
intent to be binding on third persons, it must be apparent
intent. The Hammond case has no resemblence whatsoever to the case before us. In Hammond, the court was
interpreting a California statute which imposed a lein
upon the owner of the real estate where he failed to post
notice of non responsibility. Of course, this lien only
applied to real estate. The California statute defined real
estate as follows:
"'-A thing is deemed to be affixed to land when
it is attached to it by roots, as in the case of trees,
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vines or shrubs; or imbedded in it, as in the case of
walls; or premanently resting upon it, as in the case
of buildings; or permanently attached to what is
thus permanent, as by means of cement, plaster,
nails, bolts or screws."
This definition in no way resembles the definition
under the Utah statute and cases, since it depends on the
method of attachment rather than intent to permanently
affix. In the Hammond case, the court found that no
notice had been given and, therefore, upheld a lower
court's decision holding that the land owners property was
subject to a lien. For these reasons, we feel any consideration of the Hanz1nond case in conjunction with the case
at bar would be erroneous.
(c) uThe manner of the annexation." The railings,
in question were attached to the floor by small screws ap·proximately % of inch in length. (Rec. 14 Exh. D-3).
In some places the railings were screwed into wooden abutments that were attached to the wall by screws of approximately the same length. (Rec. 14). In order to stabilize
the railings, holes approximately 1 inch in diameter were
drilled into the floor as indicated in Exhibit D 6, 7, 8, 9
(Rec. 13, 14) .
The fact that railings were designed so as to be removable without any material injury to the premises and
that the supply of matching tile was retained to cover the
screwholes in the floor is a further indication of a lack of
intent to permanently affix the railings, and in fact indicates an intent to have the railings removed. (Rec. 19,
line 23 to 30, 20, line 1 to 6):
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uMR. DAHLSTROM: Would you explain to
the Court what damage to the floor you might
contemplate by moving these railings?
uTHE WITNESS: Well, by moving the railings all that would be necessary to replace so that
it would be impossible to tell there were railings
there, would be to remove one piece of the vinyl
tile, which we have other sections for in this event,
and replace it with another section for this one, and
put a plug in the hole where the bolt goes and a
new piece of tile on it.
((MR. DAHLSTROM: Was this tile purchased and kept in contemplation of moving the
railing around?
uTHE WITNESS: Yes, or in the event we
had to replace any other section."
On page 6 of its brief, appellant claims that the Court
improperly considered testimony that the railings were removable without material injury to the premises as an indication that they were personal property. The appellant
has cited one case, decided in 1891, involving a mortgage
in which the Court found that the ability to remove without material injury to the premises was not the controlling
factor. However the appellants have not considered a
host of other authorities holding to the contrary. See
Braddees v. Smith, 121 Ala, 335, 26 So. 34, 77 Am St.
Rep. 61; Smith v. Bush, 173 Okla. 172, 44 P 2d 921 1 D 1
ALR 330; Standard Oil Co. v. La Grasse Supra Auto Service, 217 Wis. 237, 258 NW 791, 99 ALR 60; and 22 Am
Jur, Fixtures 539, P. 748 which states:
uThe majority rule is that if mortagee of land
leases it to third person and gives him a right toremove from premises any chattles, he may attach,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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such chattles do not become subject to the mortgage if they can be removed without injury to the
realty."
It seems only logical that the ahili ty to remove the
chattles would be properly considered to be one of the
facts and circumstances to be looked to in determining
intent to annex the property in question to the freehold.
In the present case, the railings could be removed without
harm to the freehold, thus, evidencing an intent not to
permanently affix them to the real estate.
The application of this rule necessarily requires a consideration of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the annexation of any items of personality to real
estate to determine the intention of the party making the
annexation to permanently affix the personality to reality.
In this case, after considering such facts and circumstances
as it saw fit, the Trial Court decided that the bank did not
affix the railings with an intention to make them part of
the real estate.

--

(d) uThe purpose for which annexation was made."
The purpose for which these railings are used, to direct
traffic within the bank and to decorate the bank's interior,
shows a lack of an reason for their permanent attachment
to the structure. (Rec. 15 line 20-24) If the building was
used for a purpose other than the conduct of a banking
business, these railings would not be needed to direct
traffic or for decoration and would be removed.
POINT II
THE STATUTE IN QUESTION, SINCE IT IS
PENAL IN NATURE, IN THAT IT IMPOSES A
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DOUBLE LIABILITY ON THE OWNER OF PROPERTY WHO PAYS AN UNBONDED CONTRACTOR, SHOULD BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED.
In the case of Backus v. Hooten, 4 U 2d 364, 294 P
2d 703 ( 1956), the Supreme Court of the State of Utah,
in considering the application of the statute involved here,
held that because of its penal nature, in imposing double
liability on unbonded property owners, the statute in question should be strictly construed. The same rule has been
followed by the Supreme Court of Florida in Greenblutt v.
Boldin, (Fla 1957) 94 So 2d 355, 59 ALR 2d, 877. A
strict construction of this statute requires that in order
to receiveth the benefits of the statute, a claimant has to
clearly establish that the property on which he hopes to
place a lien comes within the provisions of the statute. In
the present case, the only evidence introduced by the appellant to meet this burden was evidenced that the railing
in question had been manufactured by it according to
specifications as to length and height furnished it by Mr.
Arnold Drews. (Rec. p. 4) As has been pointed out above,
nothing can be inferred with respect to intent to permanently affix from the fact that an item was specially fabricated as to length and height. If the statute· in question
was strictly construed, this evidence would be insufficient
to establish entitlement to the benefits of the statute.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT, HAVING PREVAILED IN
THE TRIAL COURT, IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE
APPELLATE COURT VIEW THE EVIDENCE AND
EVERY FAIR INFERENCE AND INTENDMENT
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ARISING THEREFROM IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO IT. AND IF WHEN SO' REGARDED,
THERE IS ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, OR, AS
SOMETIMES, STATED ANY REASONABLE BASIS
IN THE EVIDENCE, TO SUPPORT THE FINDING
MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT, IT WILL NOT BE
DISTURBED.
In the case of John C. Cutler Assn. v. D. Jay Stores,
279 P 2d 700, 3 U 2d 107 ( 1955) a case where the Trial
Judge was the trier of fact, the Utah Supreme Court held
that uwhere a defenden t has prevailed in the Trial Court,
he is entitled to have the Appellate Court view the evidence
and every fair inference and intendment arising therefrom
in the light most favorable to it, and if when so regarded,
there is any substantial evidence, or, as sometimes stated,
any reasonable basis in the evidence, to ~upport the finding
made by the Trial Court it will not he disturbed."
Appellant devotes his entire brief to arguments that
the Trial Court failed, on the facts presented, to decide in
his favor. In light of the rule stated above, respondent can
see no reason for the court to consider them here. Appellant had an opportunity to present evidence in support of
his claim to the Trial Court. Appellant used that opportunity by presenting only evidence that the railings in
question were manufactured by appellant in accordance
with the specifications as to length and height provided
by Arnold Drews (Rec. 3, 4, 5 and 6). Appellant cannot
now complain when the Trial Court, after having fully
considered the evidence presented by both sides (including
any inferences favorable to appellant that may have been
drawn from evidence introduced by respondent) reaches
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a conclusion favorable to respondent. If this court were
to change the ruling of the lower court, it would be placing itself in the position of the trier of fact.
In appellants conclusion, he erroneously states that
the evidence should be considered in the light most favorable to the appellant citing King Brother, Supra. A cursory review of the King Brothers case indicates that the
rule as to consideration of evidence in the light most favorable to the appellant only ap·plies where a motion to dismiss the complaint is granted by the Trial Court. In this
present case, no such motion was granted, and therefore,
it is as clear as the sun on a cloudless day that the rule as
to consideration of evidence in a light most favorable to
plaintiff has absolutely no application here, and, it is even
clearer than the sun on a cloudless day that after considering the evidences pre sen ted by both sides, the Trial Court
was perfectly justified in deciding for respondent.
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Conclusion
Based on the evidence in the record which shows that
respondent had no intention to permanently annex the
railings in question to the land or the structures on it, and
the rule of law requiring a strict construction of the statute
in question because of its penal nature and the established
rule of law requiring the app:ellate court to rely on factual determinations of the Trial Court when supported by
evidence, it can safely be concluded that the determination
of the Trial Court was made in accordance with the law
and facts and should not be overturned.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

JOHN A. DAHLSTROM
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
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